From the introductory overview of the editors

Hélène de Largentaye’s contribution sheds light on the role France played in the Bretton Woods preparations and decisions. The author is predestined for this as the daughter of senior official Jean de Largentaye, who was already involved in these issues during the preparations for the Bretton Woods Conference as a member of a small group of "Inspecteurs des Finances" in the French government in exile. He became one of the four members of the small French delegation and later held the post of French Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund IMF for 18 years.

The preparation period and the conference itself fell at a particularly difficult time for France: De Gaulle was only able to march into Paris on 25 August 1944. This wartime event probably contributed to the fact that France's role was small and little (at least outside France) was discussed, especially since de Largentaye preferred an International Commodity Reserve Currency that had no chance to prevail against the Keynes/White Plan. France also had to be content with a quota of only 4.8% of the IMF's capital, but nevertheless joined the IMF because of the possibility of using Special Drawing Rights.

Furthermore, the article describes in detail how France made use of the possibility of devaluation on several occasions and which IMF reforms were discussed in France until the end of the Bretton Woods system. The article concludes with a critical outlook on the international and French handling of the consequences of the financial crisis 2008ff.